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I.Introduction
The past decade has brought a substantial increase in economic analyses
of phenomena outside the traditional realm of economics. An already
sizable portion of such effort has been directed toward the determinants of
desired fertility and family size.' In this paper, I will first consider the
degree to which pure economic theory can, or cannot, predict changes in
completed fertility. The second, and the major emphasis of the study, is
the way in which households produce the household commodity "child
services."2 I argue that households can increase their production of child
services either by increasing numbers of children (quantity) or by in-
creasing the resource investment (quality) •in existing children. Further,
quantity and quality are postulated to be substitutes in the household's
production function for child services. After presenting an economic model
of desired family size, emphasizing the substitutability of numbers of
children and child quality, I will discuss several of the model's important
parameters and then offer an empirical formulation based on data from
U.S. counties.
This paper is drawn from a more comprehensive study (De Tray 1972a) published
by the RAND Corporation. I have benefited greatly from many people's comments
and criticisms on earlier drafts, and would especially like to thank Gary Becker,
Yoram Ben-Porath, Glen Cain, Marc Nerlove, T. Paul Schultz, T. W. Schultz, and
Finis Welch for their many helpful suggestions, not all of which have been incorpo-
rated in this paper. I, of course, am solely responsible for any remaining errors. The
work for this paper was financed in part by grants to the University of Chicago from
the National Institute of Mental Health and the Rockefeller Foundation, and by a
grant to the RAND Corporation from the Rockefeller Foundation. Views expressed
in this paper are mine and not those of any organization with which I sos affiliated.
See,for example, Becker(1960),Schultz(1969),Willis(1969), Ben-Porath
(1970a), Nerlove and Schultz (1970), and Michael (1970).
2 Familiarity with the terminology of the "household production function" model
(Becker 1965; Lancaster 1966) is assumed throughout this paper. For a more detailed
description of this model, see De Tray (19720).
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II.Toward an Economic Model of Desired Family Size
Children are viewed in this model as home-produced durable assets from
whom parents consume a flow of services. This flow varies with both bio-
logical units of children (numbers) and with the resource intensity (qual-
ity) with which children are raised. No distinction is made between con-
sumer-durable and producer-durable aspects of children in the formal
model, although the effect of a positive opportunity cost for child-time
(children having value as produced durables) is explored (Section III).
The utilityfunction underlying household behavior has arguments
"child services" and a composite commodity, Z, representing all other
household production-consumption activities. The household utility func-
tion can be written as
U= U(C,Z), (1)
where C is the stock of child services.
This study is concerned only with households' determination of the
desired stocks of children and not with optimal timing patterns. The model
is, therefore, of the one-period, static-state variety in which the household
is assumed to make all lifetime decisions at one point in time and to have
correctly gauged lifetime conditions. Strictly speaking, it is not C but the
flow of services from C that enters the household utility function. How-
ever, in order to write the utility function as in equation (1), C need only
be measured in "efficiency units," so that total services derived are propor-
tional to the stock.
Assume that all inputs into the various production processes are per-
fectly divisible and all production functions homogeneous of degree one.3
The amount of Z produced and consumed by the household depends on
the quantities of time and purchased goods the household allocates to that
production process, the state of household technology, and the efficiency
with which that production process is undertaken. Inputs may be classified
into three categories: male (husband's) time (tm),female(wife's) time
(t,),andmarket goods and services (X)Theefficiency effect is assumed
to be a function of the environment in which production takes place,
which, in turn, depends primarily on husband's and wife's education.
The production of C is not accomplished directly through inputs of time
and goods but by way of two home-produced factors, numbers of children
3 The analysis is complicated, but the major results remain unchanged for homoge-
neous production functions of degrees other than one.
4Tosimplify the model, households are assumed to consist of a husband, a wife,
and children only; that is, other adult members are not considered. Also, throughout
this study, the terms "male time" and "female time" are used interchangeably with
"husband's time" and "wife's time" and should not be confused with hired male and
female time.
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(N), and child quality (Q).5Thecomplete household production frame-
work can be summarized by the following four equations:6
C=C(N,Q);







where=total time of the ith household member in the production of
the jth commodity or input (1 =maleor female, and jZ,N, or
= generalized index of husband's efficiency in nonmarket production;
y = generalized index of wife's efficiency in nonmarket production; and
X, = market goods and services in the jth production process.
The form of the production framework may, at first, seem arbitrary in
that N and Qmightwell be viewed as household commodities, thus
eliminating equation (2). However, the relationship between N and Z
would then be conceptually similar to that between N and Q.Themodel is
formulated to emphasize that this may not be the case; that is, a special
relationship exists between N and Qthatdoes not exist between N and
any other household commodity. In fact, the constant-returns-to-scale
assumption restricts the pure derived income elasticities of N and Qto
equality in this production framework; and thus the model has at least one
testable prediction that separates it from alternative forms. More will be
said below on this rather unusual feature of the model.
In arriving at desired lifetime levels of C and Z, households maximize
equation (1) subject not only to the technological constraint implied by
equations (2)—(5) but also to total available lifetime resources. With
respect to market goods and services, the household can spend no more
than the total earnings of all members plus any initial endowment or
wealth transfers (inheritance, dowries, and so on). That is,
P0 + . Ym+V1+V, (6)
where X = market goods and services in the jth production process, P, =
per unit price of X5, V1 = lifetime market (wage) earnings of the ith
household member, and V = non-wage related income.
The household is also constrained in the time available for work and
household production. If Tm and T, represent total time of husband and
wife respectively, then
5 For this discussion, quality may be thought of as the resource intensity with
which children are produced. The same notion is found in both Becker (1960) and
Michael (1970).
6 Note that the form of the equations implies that each production process is inde-
pendent—joint production is ruled out. Given the previous assumption of perfectly
divisible inputs, this is not a further restriction of the model (see Grossman 1971).
However, since the earlier assumption is unrealistic in certain important respects, in
Section III are mentioned possible effects of externalities, joint production, and so on,
although the model is not formally amended to take these factors into account.94 DENNISN. DE TRAY CHILD QUALITY AND DI
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Tm =Lm+tm,C+
(7)
T, = L1 ++ J
where as before, is time of the ith household member in the jth pro-
duction process, and L, indicates time spent in the market place (working).
Since time can be exchanged for goods at the market wage rate, the two
constraints (eqq.[6],[7]) can be combined into the following "full
wealth" or lifetime resource constraint:
1 Z + C
(8)
where 1 = household full wealth,= shadow price to the household of
the jth commodity, Wm = male lifetime wage rate (per unit time), and
WI = female lifetime wage rate (per unit time).
The framework set out above is structured to emphasize the possibility
that households can substitute quality for numbers of children in their
production of child services. It has also been left unrestricted to illustrate
that even in the simplified framework of equations (1)—(8), there are
serious problems involved in predicting, a priori, changes in numbersof
children.
Thefollowing equation, derived in detail in the Appendix, illustrates the
complexity of determining changes in the demand for N for given changes
in exogenous or predetermined variables in the system:7
EN = (V/I)1EV
—axN(a[kq +(1—k)a]+(1—a)a*)EPN








+(1— — + (1—h)a(i.tc,7—
+ ii[k}.tc,.y+(1 )Ey,
whereE = d (log) operator (percentage change); V = non—wage-related
A multitude of simultaneity problems have been brushed aside in this statement.
Probably the most important is the interdependence of the market wage rate and
the amount of time spent in the home, an especially severe problem for women.
For a recent attempt to deal with this, see Nerlove and Schultz (1970).DENNIS N. DE TRAY CHILD QUALITY AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN 95
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income; I = full wealth; i = income elasticity of C, child services;ci =
the share of expenditures on N in total expenditures on C, that is, (xN
-C);a" = the elasticity of substitution between N and Qinthe
production of C; a2,, = the share of expenditures on the ith input in total
expenditures on the jth output, where i = X, tm, t1andj=N, Q,Z,C;
k = the share of total expenditures on C in full wealth, I; a = substitution
elasticity between C and Z in U(C,Z);= price of market goods and
services, = lifetime market earnings of the ith household member:
W, = wage of the ith family member; and= the partial elasticity of
the ith output with respect to the educational level of the jth household
member, I = N, Q,C,Z, and j
Althoughformidable in appearance, this expression is not difficult to
interpret. Each line represents the "weighted" effect on N of a change in
one price, wealth, or productivity variable. Note that with the exception of
two variables (V and PN), the signs of the elasticity coefficients are
ambiguous. An increase in V will increase the demand for N if N is a
normal good, and an increase in PN will lead to a reduction in the demand
for N. All other coefficients depend on (1) the relative importance of
various inputs in the household production functions (as measured by their
share in total production costs), (2) the degree to which male and female
efficiency affects various production functions, and (3) relative household
expenditures on C and Z. Unless one is willing to speculate on the magni-
tudes of these weights and efficiency effects, no a priori conclusions on
fertility behavior can be drawn from the model.
A similar equation can be derived for child quality, with equally dis-
couraging results. However, restricting the analysis to the relative amounts
of N and Qimprovesthe situation somewhat. Either from the above model,
or more simply from a variant of the definition of the elasticity of substitu-
tjon,8 the following relationship for the percentage change in the ratio of Q
toC can be derived:
E(Q/N) = EQ —EN= G*[(cit— a,,,,Q)EW,,I + —
+ —(a.YQ)EPQ— — —
(10)
where the variables are defined as in equation (9).
If equation (10) were estimatable, several interesting aspects of the
model could be explored. Most important, the model assumes that derived
8The elasticity of substitution between N and Q can be written as= FE (Q/N) ]/
[E (CN/CQ)J, where C0 andare representatively the marginal products of Q and
N in production of C. But, in equilibrium, =C v/C0; therefore, a* = FE (Q/
N) I = or EQ-EN =(Exv-EtrQ). The rest of
the proof consists simply of breaking and Etc0intotheir constituent parts (see
the Appendix for this last step).96 DENNIS N. DE TRAY
pure income elasticities for N and Qareequal. This assumption runs
counter to findings of studies in the demand for household durables and
to previous speculations on the observed negative relationship between
numbers of children and household income. The formulation has a clear,
refutable hypothesis that changes in household full wealth will leave the
ratio of QtoN unaffected. Furthermore, it has the advantage of concen-
trating its explanatory power upon pure price effects.
There are several other important features of the model. One is the
separation of price of time (wage rates) and education effects. The model
assumes that education can affect household decisions ir lependent of its
well-known effect on wage rates. Thus it is meaningful to speak of the
effect of a change in education levels holding market time values constant.
Serious empirical problems raised by this treatment are discussed below.9
Another feature of the model is that the husband and wife are treated
symmetrically. Both are permitted either to work in the market place or
to engage in household commodity production. Whether one or both choose
to specialize depends especially upon the wage of the husband relative to
that of the wife and the value of each spouse's time in home production.
1ff.Supporting Evidence and Related Issues
I want to summarize a detailed but nonrigorous discussion (see De Tray
1972a) of important parameters of the model just presented. I will first try
to establish bounds for parameters associated with adult household mem-
bers and then bounds for child-related parameters, and to indicate through-
out the implications these "estimates" have for the model.
Adult Time and Adult Education
Much of the ambiguity in signs of the coefficients of education (9) stems
from a lack of information on relative weights for various inputs. It has
often been assumed (see, e.g., Willis 1969) that since men spend less time
in the home than women, expenditure shares in household production for
male time are less than for female time. This assumption is seldom ques-
tioued even though male wages are above female wages in most house-
holds.'0 If a,,2, represents the expenditure share of the ith individual's
time in all household production, then it is not obvious a priori which is
larger, atmz or
9 To be sure, there are some conceptual problems; again (see n. 7) they involve
the simultaneous nature of the household decision-making process. For example, a
woman's decision on the number of years of schooling she chooses to receive in
general will not be independent of the number of children she wants.
10 Based on the Office of Economic Opportunity's Survey of Economic Opportu-
nity, the husband's wage exceeded that of the wife in 81 percent of the households
in which both spouses were working.
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That male time in production of child services (however defined) is less
important than female time is even more generally accepted.1' This seems
indisputable at early ages, say for children under 6 years, but one must be
cautious in extending this proposition to lifetime considerations. In the
notation of equation (9), ae,,,c and areconcerned with lifetime alloca-
tion of time by husbands and wives and not merely time allocation during
the first few years of a child's life; but, for simplicity, at1will be assumed
larger than Ut,,0.
Thismodel further complicates the analysis of the role of time by
assuming that children are produced with two time-using inputs, quality
(Q)andnumbers (N). Although the direct evidence is scarce (De Tray
1972a), there are scattered indications of therelative importance of
husband's and wife's time in the production both of child services and of
QandN.
Differences in allocation of time by men and women over the life cycle
appear to substantiate the assumption that child-services production is,
indeed, more female time-intensive than male time-intensive. In his work
on time allocation by households, Smith (1972a) finds that with an in-
crease in the number of young children in the household, men work more
hours per year, but women substantially reduce the hours they work in the
labor market. The effect of older children is less clear and does not rule
out a reversal of intensities as children grow up.
Other studies of labor-force behavior (Cohen, Rea, and Lerman 1970:
Leibowitz 1974) also shed some light on the underlying production func-
tions for QandN. A most important finding of these studies for this paper
concerns the effect of children on time spent working by women with
differing educational levels. Increasing a wife's educational level appears to
increase the time (per child) she reallocates from market work to child
rearing even though highly educated women, on the average, have higher
market wage rates than do women with less education.
This behavior is open to several interpretations. One could argue that
highly educated women (or households they reside in) desire high-quality
children, and that the differential labor-force behavior of women by
education class is indicative of the female time-intensity of child quality.
This explanation has the prediction that, holding all other factors constant,
increasing the wife's wage will reduce child quality more than numbers of
children.
An alternative explanation, also consistent with the observed behavior,
stresses the role of education as an efficiency (entrepreneurial) factor in
household production. In this argument,12 more-educated women are more
11 Willis (1969), for example, assumes that the role of male time in production of
child services is sUfficiently small to be ignored.
12 Again, see De Tray (1972a) for the details of this argument and a discussion of
related issues such as birth control knowledge, simultaneity problems, and so on.cet,Q,
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efficient at producing child quality relative to numbers of children. Further-
more, an increase in female education is not factor neutral in its effects
on marginal products of inputs into the production of Q,butincreases the
value of female time more than the value of other inputs. If this is true,
highly educated women will tend to allocate more time per child to child-
services and produce more quality-intensive children than
women with less education. This explanation of female labor-force be-
havior can be summarized as follows:
!-1C.v>
>
Note that an increase in female wages does not tend to reduce quality




No mention has been made as yet of the effect of child-time, or its value, on
the household decision-making process. The formal model does not rule
out producer-durable aspects of children, but there has been no systematic
treatment of this characteristic. However, this factor has been an important
consideration in past models of desired family size and thus requires some
discussion.
Variation in the value of child-time has often been called upon as one
explanation of urban-rural fertility differences. The gist of the argument is
that farm children are a financial asset to their parents but city children are
not; therefore, farm families will desire larger numbers of children than
lyiuseholds in an urban environment, other things being equal. Note that
the emphasis is on the market (work) value of child-time. As the household
production model emphasizes, time can usually be productively employed
within the household as well. One implication of the traditional argument,
therefore, is that the elasticity of substitution between child time and
"hired" time is larger than that between child-time and adult home-time.
If this were not true, parents who live in urban areas could substitute the
child-time for their own time in the home, enabling them to allocate more
hours to work.13 Thus, in household production models rural child-time
13 The argument does not preclude the farm environment from having any effect
on desired fertility;it simply reduces the expected magnitude of the effect. In fact,
one would predict that the increase in the range of alternative uses for child-time
caused by establishing a family business such as farming would have a positive effect
on desired fertility. But, unless the new alternative significantly increased the value
of child-time to the household, the expected magnitude of the effect would not be
large.
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plays conceptually much the same role as urban child-time in the household
decision-making process, reducing the expected difference from this source.'4
The farm setting may affect more than just expected returns from child-
time. It may alter the price of both time and market goods and services
inputs into children so as to lower the shadow price of child services
relative to other household production-consumption. For example, living on
a farm may reduce the cost of female time in household production even if
the wife's market-productivity level is unchanged. The reduction stems
from increased opportunity for joint production which a family-operated
business permits. In essence, a farm wife can work and participate in home
production simultaneously, reducing the opportunity cost of female time in
household production.15 If this is true, then female time-intensive com-
modities (C) will become more attractive to a farm household.
Price effects may also encourage farm families to substitute numbers of
children for child quality within their production of child services. Goods
inputs into the production of N—for example, basic food and shelter—
are probably cheap in rural areas relative to purchased inputs into the
production of Q—for example, schooling,16 books, and travel. Under these
circumstances, farm families would find Qacostly means of increasing
child services and would choose to hold relatively large proportions of that
commodity in the form of numbers of children.
Ifis the marginal cost of the ith commodity or input in rural areas,




The discussion so far has treated both N and Qasexpected values, ignor-
ing such problems as uncertainty and poor forecasting: The effect of infant
mortality on desired family size requires elaboration, however,, since in
the empirical formulation of the model the proxy for desired family size is
not net of expected infant losses. To correct for this, the usual procedure is
14Largedifferences cannot be ruled out, given the empirical nature of the issue.
The purpose of the statement is to emphasize that the matter is one of d"gree, not
of direction.
15GlenCain has pointed out that farm children may require less supervision. thqt
is, are less time-intensive, than urban children and consequently are less costly from
that standpoint also.
16 The case for schooling seems clear from Finis Welch's work (1966) on auality
of education. Welch found that rural areas were at a disadvantage compared with
more densely populated areas in the production of "education" because rural schools
were too small to take advantage of the apparently large economies of scale in edu-
cation production.
17 For given levels of Q and N.100 DENNIS N. DE TRAY
to enter a measure of infant or child mortality as an independent variable
in regressions on desired numbers of children. Traditionally, the predicted
sign for this variable has been positive, based on the argument that high
infant mortality causes parents to hear a relatively large number of children
to ensure a given number surviving to adulthood. Note that in this theory
the implicit assumption that leads to the predicted positive relationship
is that, other things being equal, all parents desire the same number of
surviving children, regardless of the infant mortality levels they expect. To
justify this assumption, either the demand for surviving children must be
perfectly inelastic, or the cost of an infant death must be zero. It is un-
likely that either of these conditions holds; in fact, economic theory would
lead us to argue that one factor on which parents base their "target" family
size is expected losses from infant deaths or, more accurately, the costs
associated with these losses. Thus, whether an increase in infant mortality
raises or lowers observed numbers of children-ever-born will depend in
part on the costs associated with infant deaths (both pecuniary and psy-
chic), and on the elasticity of demand for surviving children.
As O'Hara (1972) points out, other forces, specifically the substitution
between QandN in the household's production of child services, may en-
courage parents to have large numbers of children, holding other things
constant, in a regime of high infant mortality. The important distinction,
however,isthat these forces do not imply the strong "replacement"
relationship that the traditional argument does. To summarize, if Pr





Summary and Predictions of the Model
Although the model and subsequent discussion result in few unambiguous
predictions,18 we are left with strong expectations on the signs of certain
coefficients in equations (9) and (10).
In equation (9), female variables should "dominate" male variables.
The effect of a change in female education or wage rates should be larger
in absolute terms and contribute more to the explanatory power of the
estimated equation than changes in male education or wages. Furthermore,
since the female wage coefficient contains large negative substitution effects,
and that for the male does not, the former should be arithmetically smaller
18 In fact, in equation (9), if (as is true) separate measures of the price of market
goods and services inputs into Q and N are not available, the only remaining predic-
tion is that an increase in non—wage-related income should increase the demand for N.
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than the latter. If both CandN are female time-intensive, the sign for
the female wage coefficient should, in fact, be negative.
Along similar lines, the sign of the female education coefficient should
reflect the nonneutral efficiency effect of that variable on the production of
N and Q,andthus should be arithmetically smaller than the male educa-
tion coefficient. Again the female coefficient is likely to be negative if the
differential efficiency effect is a significant factor.
Since the primary purpose of equation (10) is a qualitative estimate of
the relative shares of inputs into N and Q,predictionsare less apropos than
for equation (9). Nonetheless, the theory and discussion imply two proposi-
tions. First, if the effect of female education is predominantly on the pro-
duction efficiency of Q,then — should be positive. Second, house-
hold full wealth (or non—wage-related income) should have no effect on the
relative level of QtoN.
If the model is a useful representation of household decisions about de-
sired family size, we would also expect certain consistencies in the behavior
of variables between the two equations. One has already been mentioned—
female education should have a negative coefficient in equation (9) and a
positive one in equation (10). Another is that the coefficient for female
wage rate should be arithmetically smaller in equation (9) than (10),
because of the female time-intensity of child services in general. A third
is that the index of the price of market goods and services used in the
estimations should exhibit consistent behavior in both equations.
The most important implied consistency from the standpoint of testing
this particular form of the fertility model, however, is that for the behavior
of household full wealth in the two equations. As equation (9) indicates,
a non—wage-related increase in full wealth should unambiguously increase
the demand for numbers of children. In contrast, that same variable in
equation (10) should have neither positive nor negative effects on the
dependent variable, since it is assumed to affect N and Qequally.
1V.An Empirical Formulation of the Model
The results of a preliminary empirical investigation of the derived-demand
equations for numbers of children (9) and quality per child (10) follow.
The estimates are based on aggregate data drawn from a cross section of
U.S. counties.
The Data'°
The regression sample consists of 555 counties randomly selected from the
approximately 3,300 counties of the continental United States; the primary
19Amore detailed description of the data, including a list of the counties in the
sample, is given in De Tray (1972a).
1.data source is the 1960 U.S. Census of Population (U.S., Bureau of the
Census 1963b). Since these data are cross-sectional, they have a number of
shortcomings. First, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of the decision-
making process. Second, for the women who make up the sample, relevant
values of the variables are those 10—20 years prior to 1960.20 Third, the
theory yields equations whose form requires that the variables be expressed
in percentage changes, while the data are measures of levels.2'
The Variables
The two dependent variables in the theoretical framework are numbers of
children, N, and quality per child, Q/N. The numbers-of-children variable
has a relatively close empirical counterpart, children-ever-born to women
of sufficient age to have completed faniilies.22 For this analysis women
aged 35—44 were chosen as the group with essentially completed fertility.23
Constructing an operational measure of child quality is a more difficult
task. One approximate measure, in one sense of the term, is the expected
full wealth of the child. The best available statistic summarizing a child's
future economic prospects is the amount of education that child will
receive. With the additional assumption that parents base their expecta-
tions on current conditions, quality per child is empirically estimated by
the following formula:
/\/ EDEXPJ\
EXPED1= I 11 N 1'
where EXPED, = expected public school investment per child in dollars
for the jth county; = number enrolled in school in the ith age
group of the jth county; POPI,, =populationin the ith age group of the
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where9 and 6 are the
23 As mentioned earlier,
efficient at producing educl
expenditures in rural areas
analysis attempts to remove
20 This problem may not be too severe, given the time-invariant nature of the
variables used in the study.
21 This transition does not affect the expected sign of the coefficients, however. The
fundamental assumption required is that the parameters are constant over the entire
range of the activity in question.
22 One problem with this measure is that desired family size and completed family
size may differ. The most often cited example of this is that poorly educated, low-
income households do not have sufficient birth control knowledge to limit children to
the desired number. Although this view cannot be ruled out, the regression results
offer little support for it.
23 This choice was governed by the fact that this is the oldest age group for which
the Census gives children-ever-born figures at the county level in 1960. One might
argue, however, that some women in the group may plan to have additional children.
If this were particularly true for women who postponed having children in order to
participate in another time-intensive activity, attending college, then female educa-
tion and children-ever-born would exhibit a spurious correlation. Fortu-
nate[y, this does not appear to be true.(See De Tray [19720]or Sutton and
Wunderlich [1967] for evidence supporting this statement.)CHILD QUALITY AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN 103
jth county; and EDEXP, = total public educational expenditures by the
jth county. The variable EXPED measures, in dollars, the county public
educational investment each child is expected to receive. The first term on
the right-hand side is the expected number of years of schooling per child.
It is calculated under the assumption that each child of the ith age group
who is enrolled in school receives 1 year of schooling for each year the age
group spans. The second term is the expected county expenditure on educa-
tion per child per year.24
In theory, enrollment and population for each year, say between the
ages of 5and19, is required to calculate this measure accurately. In prac-
tice, the years were grouped, since the Census does not report enrollment
by individual years.25
A point of clarification may be necessary here. In the theoretical model,
child quality includes all investments in children, whereas the operational
measure of that variable appears to capture only those investments that
occur outside the home. The assumption implicit in the transition is that
total child quality is highly positively correlated with expected public
school investment at the county level.
This variable obviously has a number of other shortcomings. The most
serious involve the expenditure component. Its political nature will make
it suspect for some;it contains both current expenditures and capital
investments; it may poorly reflect the quality of education being produced
(Welch 1966) ;26 it fails to capture either private school or college invest-
ments in children, two areas where much of the variation in child quality
may be occurring. To the extent that these criticisms are valid, they will
tend to increase the error with which EXPED measures quality per child.
If capital expenditures are randomly distributed among counties, their
inclusion in the EXPED variable will reduce the explanatory power of the
regressions and increase the standard errors associated with the estimated
coefficients. The exclusion of private school and college inputs into the
r
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24 County educational expenditures are calculated from data in the 1962 County and
City Data Book(U.S.,Bureau of the Census 1962). The data are in the form of
total county government expenditures and the percentage of those expenditures classi-
fied as educational.
25The1960 Census reported enrollment at the county level for the following age
groups: 5 and 6, 7—13, 14 and 15, 16 and 17, 18 and 19. Population estimates were
available in machine-readable form only in five-year groups except for 14-year-olds.
The final formula for each county, therefore, took the following form:
rfENR,1, \ (ENR1419\ 1 /
EXPED =9 1 + 6 1 1 II
L\ POP,_13 / \ P0P14_,9 /\
where 9 and 6 are the maximum possible years of schooling for each age grouping.
20 As mentioned earlier, Welch (1966) found that rural schools were oftenless
efficient at producing education than their urban counterparts; thus, higher school
expenditures in rural areas did not always mean higher educational output. Since the
analysis attempts to remove this rural effect, the problem is somewhat mitigated here.104 DENNIS N. DE TRAY
educational process will reduce overall variation in EXPED and under-
state the amount of education received in "high-quality" counties, biasing
estimated coefficients toward zero.
The independent variables are more straightforward.27 Male and female
efficiency parameters,and 'y, are measured by median years of schooling
of adults aged 25 and over. Since wage rates by sex are not currently
available at the county level, median earnings are used to measure these
variables. Male earnings and male wage rates are sufficiently highly cor-
related, at both the aggregate and the household level, so that earnings are
a respectable proxy for wage rates. The same, unfortunately, is not true
for female earnings and wages. Smith's (1972a) work points toward.virtu-
ally no correlation between wages and earnings for individual women over
their lifetimes; however, at the highly aggregate state level, this correlation
is almost as strong as that for men.28 Even though the state sample should
more closely approximate the county sample than the individual data used
by Smith, the lack of wage rates by sex is a serious shortcoming of the
county data.
A second very serious problem with using observed earnings and even
actual wage rates to measure the value of the wife's time in the market
place was alluded to in Section II. Neither the level of wages a woman can
command in the market place nor, certainly, her market earnings are
independent of the number of children she has or wants to have in the
future. Thus, as is well known, ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression
techniques may yield seriously biased estimates of the impact of female
wages on desired children. I attempt to correct this shortcoming of the
OLS estimates by using two-stage least-squares (TSLS) techniques, but the
results are not encouraging.29
Other income (V in the model) has traditionally been difficult to mea-
sure. The Census does not enumerate other income separately but does
record median male and female earnings and median income. Unfortunately,
since base populations for these figures differ, it is not meaningful either
to calculate other income by subtracting earnings from total income30 or
to enter all three measures in the same regression.
CHILD QUALITY AND
The proxy chosen for o
county.31 Housing expern
in ways other than throt
could be argued that hou
more on housing
equal.32 A positive
housing value might the
from a positive wealth
that this is not the case.
1962; Moeller 1970, p.
penditures on housing a
the household, when oth
The number of infan
regressions to account
rate of children, thus
completed family size.
The last three variab
ture of each county. Th
areas, percentage of th
population that is non
account for cross-secti
services;33 the last, to a
other variables in the
nonwhites.
Table I contains a
statistics, and table 3
simple correlation mat
standard deviations ar
square root of the fern
31 Median value of hon
correlation between these i
32 Of course, "more
terms. In order to increase
quality of their housing, ti
Two measures of "ru
population classified as ru
population working in
measure. A problem of in
in the percentage of the
percentage of the
sector, percentage rural ai
performed very similarly,
The weighting
the denominator of the
aged 35—44 and
only one set is
27 One overall shortcoming, however, is that none of the independent variables is
age-specific. See De Tray (1972a) for a discussion of this problem. As will be seen,
an attempt is made to overcome this problem through two-stage least-squares estima-
tion techniques.
28 The simple correlation for the 48 contiguous states between male earnings and
male wages is 0.91; that same correlation for women is 0.88. The wage figures were
taken from Social Security full-time (four-quarter) earnings data (U.S., Department
of Health, Education and Welfare 1968b).
29 Professor Ashenfelter's comment on this paper was written before the TSLS
estimates were available, butI doubt that thegistof his remarks would have
changed had he seen them.
30 In fact, this procedure would lead to a negative average value for other income.DENNIS N. DE TRAY CHILD QUALITY AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN 105
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The proxy chosen for other income is the median value of housing in each
county.31 Housing expenditures and family size may, of course, be related
in ways other than through the postulated wealth effect. For example, it
could be argued that households with large numbers of children will spend
more on housing because they require more space, other things being
equal.32 A positive partial correlation between numbers of children and
housing value might therefqre stem from this "scale" effect rather than
from a positive wealth effect. The available empirical evidence indicates
that this is not the case. The results of three separate investigations (Reid
1962; Moeller 1970, p. 83; and De Tray 1972a, p. 57) confirm that ex-
penditures on housing appear to be independent of number of children in
the household, when other factors are held constant.
The number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births is included in the
regressions to account for exogenous variation in the expected survival
rate of children, thus allowing children-ever-born to be interpreted as
completed family size.
The last three variables measure the general economic and social struc-
ture of each county. They are: percentage of the population living in urban
areas, percentage of the population that is rural, and percentage of the
population that is nonwhite. The first two are included in an attempt to
account for cross-sectional variation in the price of market goods and
services;33 the last, to account for differences (if any) not captured by the
other variables in the economic opportunities and constraints faced by
nonwhites.
Table 1 contains a description of the variables, table 2hassummary
statistics, and table 3 gives weighted summary statistics. Table 4 is a
simple correlation matrix for the variables. The "weighted" means and
standard deviations are based on the original sample weighted by the
square root of the female population aged
31 Median value of housing and median income are highly correlated: the simple
correlation between these variables for this sample is 0.82.
32 Of course, "more space" and "larger housing expenditures" are not synonymous
term3. In order to increase their physical living space, families may reduce the overall
quality of their housing, thus keeping housing expenditures constant.
38 Two measures of "ruralness" were used originally, one being percentage of the
population classified as rural farm, and the other, the percentage of the employed
population working in agriculture. Initial estimates contained only the rural-farm
measure. A problem of interpretation arose with this variable in that any increase
in the percentage of the population classified as rural farm while holding constant
percentage of the population classifiedas urban impliesthat the only remaining
sector, percentage rural nonfarm, must be decreasing. However, since both measures
performed very similarly, only the rural-farm results are reported here.
34 The weighting factors are chosen so that the moment matrix will be weighted by
the denominator of the dependent variable. Since both weighting factors (women
aged 35—44andpopulation aged 5—19)yield similar weighted summary statistics,
only one set is presented.106
TABLE 1
TEE REGREssIoN VARIABLES
















The results of the regression analysis are presented in table 5. As the
model of Section II indicates, the two dependent variables, children-ever-
born and the expected schooling investment per child, as well as all mea-
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS





































URBAN 34.0 27.6 0.0 100.0
RURAL 21.6 15.3 0.0 67.2
RACE 11.4 17.4 0.0 76.0
An analysis of the residuals of the two sets of regressions was also undertaken.
The results indicate no particular underlying relationship between the CEB3S and



























CEB3S* N Children-ever-born per 1,000 married wo-
men aged 35—44, in 1960
EXPED* Q/N Expected public school investment per child
($)(seetext for formula), 1960
EDM Median years of schooling for men aged
25+, 1960
EDF y Median years of schooling for women, aged
25+, 1950
MALEARN* W55 Median earnings($)ofmales who had
earnings in 1959
FEMEARN* W1 Median earnings ($)ofwomen who had
earnings in 1959
HSEVAL* I Median value of housing ($),1960
INFDTH ... Infant deaths per 1,000 live births, 1960
URBAN Population (%)livingin towns of 2,500
inhabitants or more, 1960
RURAL Population (%)livingon farms, 1960
RACE ... Population (%)nonwhite,1960
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Variable .Mean SD Minimum Maximum
CEB 35 2,613.5 457.1 1,962.0 5,346.0
EXPED 3,027.2 982.0 323,0 8,872.1
EDM 10.3 1.34 4.9 12.6
EDF 10.8 1.22 5.7 12.6
MALEARN 4,653.0 1,093.8 913.0 6,546.0
FEMEARN 2,333.0 631.7 443.0 3,343.0
EISEVAL 12,953.0 4,346.9 5,000.0 20,200.0
INFDTH 25.5 6.48 0.0 72.5
URBAN 71.8 . 28.0 0.0 100.0
RURAL 6.81 11.19 0.0 67.2
RACE 11.3 11.7 0.0 76.0
Noir,—Each observation is weighted by the square root of the female population aged 35—44.
TABLE 4
SIMPLE CORRELATION MATRIX
Variable EXPED EDM EDF MALEARN FEMEARN
CEB 35 —0.28 —0.60 —0.53 —0.58 —0.63
EXPED ... 0.43 0.55 0.48 0.25
EDM ... ... 0.91 0.81 0.58
EDF ... ... ... 0.73 0.46
MALEARN..... ... ... ... 0.74
FEMEARN..... ...
HSEVAL .... ... ...




Variable HSEVAL INFDTH URBAN RURAL RACE
CEB 35 —0.45 0.33 —0.43 0.36 0.43
EXPED 0.25 —0.29 0.07 —0.06 —0.41
EDM 0.71 —0.37 0.49 —0.39 —0.51
EDF 0.62 —0.38 0.36 —0.24 —0.49
MALEARN .. 0.76 —0.33 0.60 —0.61 —0.49
FEMEARN .. 0.64 —0.27 0.49 —0.50 —0.43
HSEVAL .... ... —0.24 0.64 —0.46 —0.22
INFDTH ... —0.05 —0.03 0.49
URBAN ... ... ... —0.61 —0.09
RURAL ... ... ... ... 0.05,TABLE 5
THE REGRESSION RESULTS
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CONSTANT 9,33 9.38 0.347 2.88
R2
(41.1) (19.8) (0.41) (2.20)
0.75 ... 0.47 ...
F 169 10.83 51.1 2.67
N 516 516 527 527
I
For description of variables, see table 1: 1-ratios given in elasticity at mean given in
brackets (absolute value; given only for coefficients with 1-ratios1.95).
t Variable enters regressions in log form.
I Weighted by square root of female population, ages 35 to 44.
§ Weighted by square root of population, ages S to 19.
sures of earnings and full wealth, are used in log form. Following Mincer's
work,36 years of schooling for men and women enter as normal numbers,
as do infant deaths and the three measures of county characteristics, per-
centage of the population urban, rural, and nonwhite.
36See, e.g., Mincer (1974a), where he summarizes much of his previous published
and unpublished work and once again states the rationale for using years of schooling
rather than the log of that number in equations explaining wage differences.
VFor comparison, TSLS estimates treating male and female earnings and
house value as endogenous are also given in this table.37 These results do
not appear to solve the simultaneous-bias problem as had originally been
hoped.
Numbers of Children (CEB3S)
The OLS coefficients for the CEB35 regressions are remarkably strong,
especially in view of the severe multicollinearity among the variables.38 The
statistically weakest coefficient is that for male education. This may be
partly because of the close correlation of this variable with both female
education and male earnings; it may also indicate that with earnings, full
wealth, and female education held constant, changes in male education have
little effect on numbers of children. The female education coefficientis
strongly negative, with an elasticity at the mean of approximately —0.3.
In the past it has been argued that education is a proxy for either price
of time (female education) or permanent wealth (male education), or that
education captures differences in contraceptive knowledge. With respect to
the first of these, an attempt has been made to remove wealth and time-
price effects. The continued existence of a significant negative coefficient
for female education and a very weak positive coefficient for male educa-
tion indicates that these variables may have effects on numbers of children
that are not associated with either wealth or relative prices. This result is
consistent with the earlier contention that increasing female education
increases the efficiency with which child quality can be produced but has
little effect on the production technology of numbers of children.
The alternative education-contraception hypothesis isdifficult to dis-
prove, particularly in aggregate data such as these. It is my opinion, based
on my own work and that of others, that the strength of the female-
education coefficientis not attributable to differences in contraceptive
knowledge across the U.S. population, but the case is far from proven
either way.
Increases in median value of housing have a small but significant posi-
tive effect on CEB35. In her housing-income study Reid (1962) found
the pure income elasticity for housing expenditures to be around 2.0. If
this latter measure is taken as correct, the HSEVAL coefficient implies on
See n. 29 in this regard. The excluded "exogenous" variables are percentage of
the population with less than 5 years of schooling and with12years or more of
schooling(educationaldistributionparameters),percentageofthepopulationin
different age categories (21-plus and over 65), median age of population, and several
measures of parent background such as percentage foreign born and percentage whose
parents were foreign born.
The various tests for multicollinearity suggested in Farrar and Glauber (1967)
were applied to the regressions. The worst problem occurred, as one might suspect,
between male and female education.
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the average an income (full-wealth) elasticity for numbers of children
of 0.12.
Although the simple correlation between male and female earnings is
quite high (0.73), the effects of these variables on CEB3S differ consider-
ably. An increase in male earnings has a positive effect on children-ever-
born, but an increase in female earnings has a strong negative effect.
Elasticities associated with these variables are 0.09 for male earnings and
—0.30 for female earnings. These results are consistent with previous
findings and my discussion of these variables above. Numbers of children,
as well as child services in general, have long been assumed to be female
time-intensive; therefore, an increase in the price of female time causes
households to substitute away from both numbers of children and child
services.39 If the opposite is true for men, that is, that the share of male
time in the production of both N and Cissmall relative to the share of
male time in other household commodities (Z),thenan increase in the
price of male time will bring about a substitution toward both N and C.
Thecoefficient of the infant-death-rate variable is never significantly
different from zero. In part, this may be due to the offsetting effects asso-
ciated with this variable (see discussion above).40
The variables URBAN and RURAL behave as predicted under the
assumption that they measure variations in the price of market goods and
services. An increase in percentage urban lowers the desired number of
children,'but a similar change in percentage rural increases the desired
number of children.
In the past, demographers and sociologists have implied that nonwhites
produce more children than whites, other things being equal. The coeffi-
cient for RACE contradicts this belief.41 If education levels and earnings
are held constant, increasing the percentage nonwhite in a country has, if
anything, a weak negative effect on children-ever-born.
Table 6 illustrates the reasonable magnitude of effects on predicted
numbers of children-ever-born associated with plausible changes in certain
variables.42 If the OLS estimates are valid, a rather strong assumption
Again, the reader must be cautioned about the simultaneous natureofthe
female-earnings variable. The OLS regression technique used inthis reportisnot
capable of distinguishing the effect of earnings on desired children from thatof
children on female earnings. Therefore, this coefficient may contain a serious simul-
taneous bias. The degree to which the TSLS estimates solve this problem is discussed
later in the text.
40 It may also reflect the fact that the expected infant mortality rates on which
women 40 years old in 1960 based their fertility decisions were those of 1940 or so,
not those of 1960.
However, see Gardner's paper in this book for evidence that contradicts this finding.
42 The choice of the "plausible changes" was not entirely arbitrary. In each case,
the 1960 values for the variables were increased or decreased by the percentage change
for comparable variables between 1950 and 1960; thus, the "prediction" is for decen-
r
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TABLE 6
PREDICTED DECENNIAL CHANGE IN CHILDREN-EVER-BORN PER WOMAN Acm 35—44
Initial predicted value (1960)* 2.66children-ever-born
Changes in exogenous variables:t
Female education















* Calculatedusingfirsttwo significantdigitsof OLS coefficientonly. TSLS estimates yielded
net results even though individual coefficients differ.
4 Based on 1950-60 changes for comparable variables.
I Represent real, not nominal, changes.
given the inadequacies of the data, zero population growth is, so to speak,
just around the corner. The postulated changes in the yariables indicate
a reduction in predicted family size from 2.7 children per woman to 2.4
over a 10-year period.
Quality per Child (EXPED)
The proxy chosen for quality per child (EXPED) is an admittedly crude
first attempt to quantify that potentially important variable. The results
of the regressions on public school expenditures should, therefore, be
viewed with much more skepticism than those for the number of children.
It seems likely that problems caused by the level of aggregation and
simultaneous bias may be even more severe than those encountered in the
CEB3S results. Finally, even though the EXPED regressions are open to
several alternative, and reasonably plausible, explanations, they will be
discussed as if the proxy variables do measure what they are supposed to
measure.
Male education (EDM) and percentageofthepopulationrural
(RURAL) exhibit what appears to be anomalous behavior. The male-
education coefficientisinsignificant or negative, implying that either
(1)the effects of that variable are approximately the same both for
numbers of children and for child quality, or (2)ifanything, male educa-
tion contributes more to the production efficiency of numbers of children
than to the efficiency with which child quality is produced.
As for the RURAL measure, it was argued during the discussion of the.
CEB3S results that URBAN and RURAL captured cross-sectional varia-
tion in the price of market goods and services. Implicit in this statement is
thai, not annual, changes in the variables. Note that only those variables with statis-
tically significant coefficients were changed.112 DENNISN. DE TRAY
thepresumption that in rural counties those market goods and services that
are primary inputs into numbers of children will be cheap relative to goods
and services entering child-quality production. This, in turn, implies that
the coefficient for RURAL in the EXPED regressions should be negative;
in fact, this coefficient is strongly positive.
Part of the solution of this puzzle may be found in Welch's (1966)
work on quality in education, where he observes that educational expendi-
tures are, in and of themselves, poor indicators of the quality of education
being produced by schools. He attributes this to the existence of "econo-
mies of scale" in the educational process. In essence, his argument is that
schools in sparsely populated areas suffer because their facilities fall well
below the optimal size.43 If this is true, rural areas are likely to receive
less education per dollar expenditure than more densely populated urban
areas.
These scale effects will at minimum cause EXPED to overestimate
quality per child in rural areas. The positive coefficient for RURAL may
be a result of this latter phenomenon plus the fact that education, earn-
ings, and income are being held constant. In other words, if the rural
population has tastes similar to those of the urban population for quality
per child as measured by EXPED, then, with prices and income held con-
stant, rural counties are likely to have relatively high educational expendi-
tures per eligible population to partly offset the inefficiencies of their school
systems.
Female education has a strong positive sign, as would be expected from
the earlier efficiency arguments and the partial correlation of female edu-
cation in the children-ever-born regressions. Since quality does not appear
to be particularly female time-intensive compared with numbers of children
(the OLS coefficient for female earnings is not significant in the EXPED
regression), this finding lends support to the "efficiency" (as opposed to
time-intensity)explanation of the observed differences by educational
class in female labor-force participation.
It is tempting to interpret the insignificant coefficients for HSEVAL as
indicating that derived income elasticities for Q(totalquality in children)
and for N (numbers of children) are equal in size.44 This interpretation
supports the quantity-quality substitution hypothesis Sand the particular
functional forms chosen for the model. Indeed, it is surprising that EXPED
and HSEVAL are not positively related if for no other reason than that
school expenditures are usually derived from property taxes. However, it
is always difficult to attach precise meaning to insignificant coefficients:
therefore, this finding must be viewed with considerable caution.
43Also,Welch points out that a significant fraction of rural educational expenditures
went for transportation, which, again, implies that rural school dollars "buy" less
education than urban school dollars.
44Thatis, EXPED is a proxy of Q/N (the relative amount of Q to N), which is
invariant with respect to scale (nonwage income) effects.
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As in the CEB3 5 regression, male and female earnings have very different
effects on quality per child. The strength and size of the positive male-
earnings coefficient make its theoretical interpretation suspect. According
to theory, this result implies that male time is used more heavily in quantity
than in quality production.
The strong negative coefficient for infant death rates is consistent with
the theory that the higher the probability of a child's dying, the less likely
parents are to invest large amounts of resources in that child (see O'Hara
1972). The statistical strength of this coefficient may also be a function
of the fact that the rate at which infants survive is not, as has been tradi-
tionally assumed, always exogenous to household decisions. The more
resources invested in a child, the more likely that child is to survive. But
the more resources a household invests in children, the higher the "quality"
of those children. Thus infant mortality and expected school expenditures
may both measure child quality; it is not surprising, therefore, that they
are strongly related.
TSLS Estimates
One question is why I concentrate on OLS results when TSLS estimates
should yield less biased coefficients. One simple answer is that my two-stage
estimates are not included in this paper. A second more substantive reason
is that for these data the apparently do not do what they
were expected to do, that is, solve the simultaneous-bias problem. If an OLS
estimate of, say, the impact of female earnings on children-ever-born seri-
ously overstates the size of that effect, then TSLS techniques should produce
a reduced estimate of the female-earnings coefficient. As equation (2) con-
firms, female earnings have a larger impact on numbers of children in the
TSLS regressions than in the OLS results. It seems likely, then, that the
TSLS procedures simply yield more error-free measures of the included
endogenous variables, but do little to reduce simultaneous bias.
Summary of Empirical Results
Both sets of regressions (CEB35 and EXPED) imply that production of
child services is dominated by women. The role of men seems to be pri-
marily as suppliers of market goods and services, but this part of the
picture is still unclear.
Female earnings are the single most important factor in the completed-
family-size regressions in terms of both magnitude of effect and statistical
significance. Other variables having a significant negative effect on children-
ever-born are female education and the degree to which a county is urban.
On the other hand, median value of housing as a proxy for full wealth and
male earnings exerts a positive influence on desired numbers of children.114 DENNIS N. DE TRAY
In addition, the children-ever-born regressions indicate that (1) the full-
wealth elasticity for numbers of children is probably positive but small,
and (2)wheneconomic differences are accounted for, race may play vir-
tually no role in determining family size.
The regressions on quality per child are weaker than those for numbers
of children. In part, this must stem from the proxy variable used in the
regressions (expected county public school investment), which undoubt-
edly contains large errors of measurement. The very tentative findings
from these regressions are, first, that female education increases the relative
efficiency with which child quality is produced, thereby reducing its effec-
tive real price, and, second, that the derived income elasticities for numbers
of children and for child quality appear to be equal. Also, although it is
not a prediction of the theory, the behavior of the rural and race measures
is consistent with the hypothesis that there is little difference in "tastes"
for child quality either between rural and urban residents or between
whites and nonwhites, other things being equal.
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Now, combining (Ag') and (All') with (Afl, the following expression for the
percentage change in N is obtained:
EN=(V/J)1EV
—axN +(1k)cc]+(1—a)a*)EPN
+ (1— a)[iy*—— (1—k)cIJEPQ
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Inorder to ease the reader's task, nonmnemonic symbols all will be defined here:
E = d(log) operator (percentage change);
V = non—wage-related income;
I= full wealth;
= income elasticity of C, child services;
a= the share of expenditures on N in total expenditures on C, that
is,
cit = the elasticity of substitution between N andQinthe production
ofC;
= the share of expenditures on the ith input in total expenditures
on the jth output, where i = X,t1, and j=N, Q,Z,C;
k= the share of total expenditures on C in full wealth, I;
ci= substitution elasticity between C and Z in U(C, Z);
= price of market goods and services
= lifetime market earnings of the ith household member, i = m,f;
= wage rate of ith household member; and
= the partial elasticity of the ith output with respect to the educa-
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When an important social issue emerges that does not fall into the tradi-
tional domain of economic analysis, there is always some uneasiness about
the usefulness of economists' applying their tools in the new domain. Since
I believe that economic tools are useful in the analysis of social problems,
it is my own view that it is important for economists' methods to be ex-
tended into these "nontraditional" fields as far as possible, and I interpret
the works of Becker and Mincer cited so frequently throughout this con-
ference as among the original efforts to do this. Moreover, in a subject as
important as the economic determinants of fertility control, I find some-
what shortsighted the comments of those economists who argue that the
explanations for most of the variation in birth rates or family size are non-
economic or sociological factors. For even if it is true that the historical
explained variance for economic variables is small, this position ignores the
fact that most of the social programs of interest to economists in recent
years—including negative income taxes, demo-grants, and housing allow-
ances—change the income and effective wage rates that many families in
some economic strata will face, and that any careful analysis of the social
and economic consequences of these programs should include an objective
appraisal of their long-run effects on population size. The ability to obtain
such an appraisal is presumably the long-run goal of the economic analysis
of population.
At the same time, it seems important to me that when economic tools
are applied in unfamiliar terrain, the work should be done with special
clarity and without any exaggeration of their power to obtain rigorous pre-
dictions concerning observable variables. In addition, our standards for
evidence regarding the validity of hypotheses should,ifanything, be
stronger than in more traditional areas. On both of these grounds Dennis
De Tray's paper leaves something to be desired.
As to the underlying theory, itis essentially an application of the
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classical theory of consumer choice to the demand for children. In order to
test the usefulness of this theory, one presumably should first clarify its
implications, which, though limited, are nevertheless powerful, even in this
case. On the one hand, for example, one could observe the demand for
some commodity that is clearly and directly related to childbearing, as,
for example, the cost of maternity services, and estimate the income-
compensated effect of a change in the price of these services on the
demand for them, which the theory would predict is negative. Alterna-
tively, one could observe the demand for two goods or services thought to
be related in utility to the demand for children in order to test whether the
income-compensated cross-price effects were equal, which is also an un-
ambiguous prediction from the theory. Instead, De Tray attempts to
determine the empirical importance of changes in the wage rate of the wife
on the demand for children, following up the interesting observation by
several economists that the wife's nonmarket time and the family's demand
for children may be economic complements. Unfortunately, unless we
assume that all of the wife's nonmarket time must be used for child rear-
ing, we cannot predict that complementarity will be the case, just as we
cannot predict that the effect of a pure (nonlabor) income increase will be
to increase the demand for children. We are thus left with a useful theo-
retical framework, but not much else.
As to the empirical estimates, these are based on intercounty differences
in the number of children-ever-born to women aged 35—44 and on the
expected expenditure on public schooling, the latter presumed to be a
proxy for the expected quality of children. As they stand, I find these
empirical results far from convincing of the case De Tray intends to make.
Concentrating, for example, on the effort to estimate the extent of the
complementarity between the wife's nonmarket time and the family's
demand for children, one would presumably want to regress completed
family size on some permanent wage level. Unfortunately, however, the
observed wage rate suffers from the deficiency that it is determined in part
by the extent of labor-market experience that a woman has had, and the
latter is clearly smaller for women who have larger families. There is thus
likely to be a strong negative correlation between completed family size and
observed wage rate, but with the causation running from the former to
the latter.1 This problem would clearly be solved satisfactorily only in a
simultaneous-equations framework, but some estimates of the likely biases
in De Tray's results might be inferred by using some of the standard
methods for analysis of specification error. In practice, however, it is not
entirely clear how useful this exercise would be with De Tray's data, since
the independent variable in his regressions is not the wage rate of women
1See,e.g., Oaxaca (1971) for estimates from microeconomic data that purport to
show this latter relationship and for an explicit discussion of the effect of labor-force
experience on the wage rates of women.
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buttheirannual earnings. Now, itis well known that the labor-force
participation and weeks worked of women with children are lower than
those of women without. Since annual earnings are the product of the
wage rate and annual hours, it follows that the number of children a woman
has and her annual earnings are likely to have a strong negative correla-
tion, but again with the causation running from the former to the latter.
Analyzing the compound effect of these biases is likely to be difficult,
particularly when another variable—namely, house value—that isalso
jointly determined with the demand for children and the demand for the
nonmarket time of the wife, is included on the right-hand side of the
regression equation.
Though interesting, it will take better data and a more complete model
before De Tray's results are likely to convince very many economists that
we have reliable estimates of the basic parameters in the application of
economic analysis to the determination of family size.
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